Asubset of ADA is introduced, ADA-CF. to study the basicsynchronization and communication primitive of ADA, the rendezvous.
Introduction
In this paper, we study the proof theory of the basic ADA synchronization primitive, the rendezvous.
A subset of ADA, the ADA concurrency fragment with acronym ADA-CF, is defined for which a Hoare-style proof system is developed to prove partial correctness properties, which is sound and relatively complete as proven in [ 151. Thus, we take Hoare's recommendation [IS] to work out simple consistent subsets of ADA seriously. The proof system is based on the CSP proof system in [5] which has as key-notion, the notion of cooperation between proofs. For languages system demonstrates that this is the case, indeed. It shows that proofs for this combination simply split into separate proofs for
(1) the procedure-body (assuming no communication) and (2) the synchronization and communication involved.
We take the absence of additional proof theoretical complexity as an indication that, seen in the broader perspective of developing programming concepts in general, the rendezvous mechanism provides us with an elegant communication primitive.
This situation is a particularly lucky one, since the given characterization of the rendezvous extends to so-called remote procedure calls in general (see [2] ). Consequently, our proof techniques apply in principle to a whole family of languages for distributed communication, including e.g. Concurrent Pascal [8] , Distributed Processes (DP) [9] , *MOD [l l] and Mesa [22] ; this thesis receives additional support from the fact that our proof techniques were initially developed for another language, DP [26, 143. Technically, the main contribution of this paper is the generalization of the idea of cooperation, as developed for csp-type communication of transmitting simple values, to ADA-type communication.
A second contribution of this paper is that it describes a method for proving invariance (or safety) properties in general. Notably, this method does not require further strengthening of our proof techniques. It describes how to derive more information from the same proofs, instead. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the subset
ADA-CF
and its informal semantics: for a more formal semantics, the reader is referred to [25] or [15] . In ADA-CF, only the bare essentials of ADA-tasking have been retained. Notably, the subset does not admit shared variables, access-variables to tasks (or any other object), task-creation and entry queues. This last restriction is not as serious as one might think it to be; see Section 9 of this paper and [25] . Section 3 is the heart of the paper in which the partial correctness proof system is developed.
Section 4 contains the first large(r) example proof of a program implementing a buffered producer-consumer system. In Section 5 the proof system is extended to deal with safety-properties which generalize partial correctness properties.
Notably, no new proof rules have to be introduced. This section also introduces the necessary terminology and techniques which are used in Section 6
to deal with deadlock freedom and in Section 7 to deal with termination and absence of failure (i.e., clean termination).
For these three properties, new proof rules and tests are needed. All this culminates in Section 8 which contains the second large example proof. We consider a version of a linear time parallel sorting algorithm of Brinch Hansen [9] and prove it correct and deadlock and failure free. In fact, we prove that the algorithm can be used as a priority queue. Section 9 discusses some ADA constructs which can be added to our subset without much trouble. Notably, we show how to incorporate the terminate-statement of ADA, which introduces a distributed termination convention not unlike that of CSP [17] . Also, the absence of entry queues and some syntactic restrictions on the variables in ADA-CF are discussed. Finally, Section IO formulates a conclusion and discusses some related work. 
The subset ADA-CF
The syntax of ADA-CF is described, using a BNF-grammar augmented with the following embellishments (see also [I, 9 1.51):
(a) Script prefixes in the nonterminals are irrelevant.
I.e., uat_id and eH/ry_id are both equivalent to the nonterminal id ; (b) Square brackets enclose optional items. I.e., the production decl::= [entry_decl] [oar_decl] also produces the empty string; (c) Braces enclose a repeated item, which can be repeated zero or more times.
I.e., the production id-list ::= id {,id} produces lists of one or more id's. The reader who is familiar with ADA will notice that some liberties have been taken with the ADA syntax which is verbose at times. R4. For any call-statement, call T.a(e,, . . . , e, # x,, . . . , x,) (i) x,, . . . , x, must be all distinct, (ii) Fv(e,. . . . , e,) A {x,, . . . , x,} = 8.
These restrictions
will be discussed later on in Sections 3 and 9.
Next, we give an informal description of the semantics. An ADA-CF program consists of a fixed set of tasks. These tasks are all activated simultaneously and executed in parallel. When execution reaches the end of a task-body, that task terminates.
Each task can have declarations of variables (all of type integer) and of entries, which may be 'called' by other tasks. The actions to be performed, when such an entry is called, are specified by matching accept-statements for this entry. Execution of an accept is synchronized with the execution of a matching entry call. Consequently, a task executing an accept or entry call, will be suspended until another task reaches a matching entry call or accept, after which the statements of the accept-body are executed by the called task, while the calling task remains suspended. This action is called a rendezvous and is the only means of communication between.and synchronization of tasks: in particular, there are no global (i.e., shared)
variables. After a rendezvous, the two tasks engaged in this rendezvous continue their execution in parallel again. A program aborts (or fails) if (I) an entry is called of a task that has already terminated or (2) a task terminates, while other tasks are still waiting for a rendezvous with one of the entries of this terminated task.' Apart from the synchronization involved, the rendezvous-action is similar to an ordinary call for a procedure, having as body the body of the accept participating in the rendezvous.
A task may only contain accepts for one of its own entries, but it may contain more than one accept for the same entry. Each accept specifies a formaLpart for its entry: all accepts for the same entry should specify the same formaLparr. The first set of parameters in such a formaLpart, closed-off by the '#'-sign, consists of value parameters (i.e., are of mode in, using ADA-parlance) ; the second set consists of initialized result parameters (i.e., are of mode in out).
Hence, in the actuaLpart of a matching call, the first set of actual parameters may be (integer) expressions, the second set must be variables. The parameters specified by an accept are local in scope w.r.t. the accept-body. Execution of a rendezvous between an entry call and a (matching) accept starts by assigning the values of all actuals to all formals. Then, the accept-body is executed after which the computed values of the formal result parameters are assigned to the actual result parameters. More, precisely, if C = call T.e(f # x) and A = accept e(u # u) do S endaccept, then executing a rendezvous between C and A can be seen as executing the statement .'u:=f; u :=x; s; x:= v"; this statement will in the sequel be denoted by "CIIA".
Note that the association of the actual with the formal parameters (call-by-valueresult) is in full agreement with the ADA reference manual [I, P 6.23 . In Section 4 we will show that this program satisfies begin task producer 11 task consumer (1 task buffer end {Vi= I..n vecI(i)= vec2(i)}.
Here, {p} S 19) expresses, as usual, that any computation of S starting in a state that satisfies the assertion p, terminates in a state that satisfies q or does not terminate at all. I.e., it expresses partial correctness. The assertion-language in which p and q are expressed is an ordinary first-order one, with the usual logical connectives and quantifiers. The non-logical symbols of the assertion-language, are the functions and predicates that are used in the program in question. The proof system will be formally developed for ADA-CF programs though. Hence, it will deal with the integer data type only (and so must the corresponding assertion language).
The proof system
The proof system is similarly structured as the one of Owicki in [24] or the csp-system of Apt et al. [5] : In order to prove a property about a program, one first constructs separate proofs for the component tasks in isolation and then combines these component proofs to obtain a proof of this property. In general the component tasks will influence each other. Consequently, within a component proof one has to make assumptions about the behaviour of the environment of the task. Therefore, if these component proofs are to be combined, these assumptions should be consistent and must be checked. This explains the need for tests such as the interference freedom test of [24] and the cooperation test of [5] . Because of the close relationship between ADA-CF and CSP communication, the consistency test on component proofs of the ADA-CF system will be based on the CSP cooperation test. Such tests introduce a meta-element in Hoare-style proof systems, because they refer to properties of proofs. The natural notion of proof for which such tests can (formally) be defined is that of proof outlines; first introduced by Ashcroft in [6] and subsequently used for Owicki's 'general programming language', GPL, in [24] and for CSP in [5] . In the case of GPL and CSP, it is a rather trivial problem what consistency test has to be imposed upon the proof outlines (of course, the specific form such a test takes may be less trivial to find). In the case of ADA-CF, the reader will see that there is a subtle problem involved in this choice.
To 'separate' the component proofs from each other, the following axiom and proof rule are adopted:
Al. call: {p}call T.e(T#f){q}, provided FV(P)~{?}= 0. The arguments Rand .f denote respectively the value expression list and the value result variable list; the domain of FV has been extended so as to yield the set of free variables of its argument assertion(s). This axiom expresses that in a component proof, anything may be assumed about the result of executing an entry call. Of course such an assumption must be checked later on. The restriction on the free variables of the pre-assertion will be discussed in the sequel.
Rl. accept:
{ p} accept e( ii # C) do S endaccept {q} provided {i;, c} n FV( p, q) = 0. First of all, the rule forces a proof of the accept-body to be given. However, it does not enforce relationships between the pre-and post-assertion of the body and the pre-and post-assertion of the accept. This is reasonable as p' and q' must say something about the values of the formal parameters, which are (partly) determined by the environment.
Consequently, these assertions have to be checked too, later on. The formal parameters are local w.r.t. the accept-body, whence the restriction on the variables free in p and q.
These are augmented by the following rules and axioms:
A2. null:
1 PI null {PI. 
IPI Slql { p} begin S end {q}
In the sequel, a task will often be mentilied with its body, in the sense that {PI task T(q) or {PI T{ql will be written where {p} begin Send {q} (being the body of task T) is meant.
Using these rules, properties about tasks (or task-bodies) in isolation can be proved. Such proofs can be given an alternative form by annotating the task-body with the assertions generated by its proof; i.e., each sub-statement S of the task-body can be annotated with the assertions used in the application of one of the above rules or axioms to S. It is straightforward to make this precise: (1) (2)
(8) 
Such proof outlines correspond
with the purely sequential part of an ordinary proof. It is easy to see that a proof outline is valid for a formula {p} S {q}, precisely when its pre-and post-assertions can be used in an ordinary proof for {p} S {q}. The conditions (l)-( 10) restrict the assertions to those that can be obtained by using one of the proof rules or axioms given.
' The notion of bracketing will be explained later on. Until then, the reader may safely ignore this equirement.
Apparently,
with proof outlines a special kind of proof corresponds: namely proofs in which no two applications of a proof rule or axiom refer to the same statement;
otherwise the pre-and post-assertions of this statement would not be unique. We will return to this fact later on. Subsequent discussions will always refer to proofs in this form; an example will shortly follow.
In the proof outline of a component task T, assumptions are made about the behaviour of the tasks that T communicates with. To be more specific, T makes assumptions about the values it receives, both for the value-result parameters on termination of an entry call and for the formal parameters, when T enters an accept. Using these assumptions the proof outline for T specifies in a sense the behaviour to which T commits itself; i.e., the appropriate pre-assertions specify the values sent off to a task which becomes engaged in a rendezvous with T. In essence, the consistency test must show that the behaviour of each task satisfies the assumptions concerning its behaviour, made by the task communicating with it. This discussion makes the following more precise statement of the cooperation test plausible: The first clause is clear enough, asking to derive the post-assertions of the entry call and accept, if a rendezvous between these two occurs, (necessarily) in a state obeying the two pre-assertions.
The discussion of how formulae like {p} C 11 A {q} are proved, is deferred for a while.
The second clause forces independence of the proof outlines: No proof outline may refer to variables of other tasks; hence, a proof outline cannot be invalidated by actions elsewhere and, consequently, no 'interference freedom' need be established [24] . However, this restriction does not applyto variables that are not changed in the program. Such so-called freeze variables are needed to prove relations between variables of different tasks. As a consequence, only post-assertions of entry calls and the pre-assertions of accept-bodies make assumptions about the behaviour of other tasks (so that only these assertions have to be checked). This is reasonable because at these places only, outside information is injected into a task. 
Application
of the consequence rule yields {x = z} begin task T 11 task T' end {x = y}.
As the value of z and hence of x has not been specified, (3.2) holds too. Using this rule, the last step in the example proof can be formalized using the substitution [x/z] (and then applying the consequence rule). The above simple-minded approach to cooperation is too weak in general: The first clause of its definition requires one to prove a formula involving an entry call C and an accept A, but only if C and A can actually become engaged in a rendezvous. This cannot be inferred from the program text alone but has to be semantically characterized.
Consequently, it raises the dual problem of characterizing the absence of a rendezvous.
A rendezvous between A and C can only occur if there is an execution of the program that reaches a state in which control resides both at A and C. Now, in a (valid) proof outline, the pre-assertion of some statement, by definition, characterizes all computations reaching this statement. Consequently, a rendezvous be+ulPen A and C cannot occur, whenever pre( C) A p-e(A) --, false.
The following example and subsequent discussion addresses the question whether assertions can be made strong enough to express the impossibility of a particular rendezvous. clearly holds. In order to prove it, the post-assertion of the second accept in a proof outline of T' necessarily must imply x =2. If this post-assertion is to pass the cooperation test, the conjunction of the pre-assertion, p, of the first entry call in T with the pre-assertion, 9, of the second accept in T' must somehow yield false, expressing that this rendezvous will not take place during execution, thus trivializing the cooperation test for this pair. Consequently, 9 must express something like "if T' is at the second accept then T must be after its first entry call". But precisely this type of assertion is ruled out by the second clause of the cooperation test! Besides, there is the moot point of how to express such conditions at all.
In other words, this example suggests the proof system to be (still) incomplete in the sense that not every operationally true property can be proved. It illustrates the difference between a syntactically matching pair-such as the call in T" and the first accept in T'---, and a semantically matching pair-such as the call in T" and the second accept in T'.
To determine which of the syntactic matches also match semantically, the example suggests that it needs relating states of different tasks to each other. For this purpose, the proof system is augmented with a global invariant, GI, which may also carry other global information needed for a proof. GI expresses in general which rendezvous' occurred and which values were sent and received during these rendezvous'; in short, it expresses (or encodes) the communication-history.
As is well-known, to express relations between the states of different tasks in general, either the state of each task has to be explicitly extended with a locution counter or the tasks have to be extended by statements involving fresh, so-called auxiliary variables. For this proof system the latter option is chosen, as in [S] and [24] .
For example, if the tasks T and T' in Example 3.3 are augmented with auxiliary variables i and j respectively (both initialized to 0), the fact that T has executed its first call can be encoded in i by inserting the assignment i:= I between the two calls. Likewise, to encode that T' has executed its first accept, an assignment j:= I can be inserted between the two accepts in task T'. Then the pre-assertion, p, of the first call in T can be chosen so as to imply j=O (j is initialized to 0); The pre-assertion, q, of the second accept in T', can be chosen so as to imply j = I. A global invariant, Z = j = I + i = I, would express the property "if T' is after its first accept (j = I) then T must be after its first call (i = I)". Consequently, if control could be at the first call in T and simultaneously at the second accept in T', the program-state would satisfy p A q A Z (I is assumed to be globally invariant), which implies i = 0 A j = 1 A (j = I--, i = l), which is equivalent to false. This shows that this situation can in fact not occur during execution and it trivializes the cooperation test for this matching pair.
Unfortunately, Z is not a global invariant for the program because of the problem of updating its free variables. Since the assignments to i and j need not (and in general will not) be executed simultaneously, Z can be invalidated.
To resolve this problem, the range over which a general invariant, GI, must hold is restricted as in Notice that confining the updating of cl-variables to bracketed sections only, implies that to ensure invariance of GI, only bracketed sections have to be checked and that GI may be assumed to hold when entering such a section (provided GI holds initially). This suggests the following parallel composition meta rule:
R9. parcom: proofs of { pi} task I& {qi} (i = 1 ..n) cooperate w.r.t. GI {PI A ' -'hp, h~l}begintask T,lj---lItask T, end{q, A* -*A qn AGI} provided no variable free in GI is updated outside a bracketed section and GI does not contain formal or actual parameters as free variables.
The reason not to allow formal or actual parameters to appear free in Gr, is to prevent some additional complications to occur: Allowing actual parameters, would introduce an aliasing problem, as a variable of GI then could be updated under a different name. Allowing formal parameters, would complicate the rendezvous rule, RI 1, to be developed below.' In general, problems will arise if proofs are combined (using this rule) of tasks which share variable-names, because of possible nameclashes in the consequent of the rule. This motivates restriction Rl of Section 2, which restricts the subset to programs in which no name-sharing occurs. In the sequel we will refer to proofs for a program begin task T, \I* -* (1 T. end, which sturt in an asserfion p, meaning that there exist a set of valid proof outlines TI,..., Ti, which cooperate w.r.t. some GI and such that Finally, a rule is needed to remove auxiliary variables from a program again (this rule is similar to the ones in [S] and in [24] ):
RlO. AV: Let AVAR denote a set of variables, elements of which appear in S' only in assignments of the form x := t with x E AVAR and r any expression. Then
provided Fv( q) n AVAR = 0 and S is obtained from S' by deleting assignments to and declarations of variables in AVAR.
Example 3.4. Now, the formula {true} begin task T (1 task T' 11 task T" end {x = 2) (3.5)
of Example 3.3 can be verified, indeed. To express the necessary assertions, three auxiliary variables, i, j and /c, are introduced into the proof outlines of T, T' and T", respectively. The proof outlines will be less detailed than in the previous example, but the reader will have no difficulty in providing the missing details. end {j= 1 Ax=2}
In this proof, the following global invariant, GI, is used:
(j= l-i= l)~(k= l+j= 1).
Now clearly, the individual proof outlines are correct and the second clause of the cooperation test holds too. As for clause 1, first consider the not semantically matching pairs: The first call in T with the second accept in T', and the call in T" with the first accept in T'. It is easy to see that the conjunction of the pre-assertions with GI, i=OAj=1AX=1A(j=lt,i=I)A(k=1+j=t) and k=lAj=OA (j=lHi=l)A(k=l + j = 1) respectively, both yield false. Next the semantic matches:
(1) The first call in T with the first accept in T'. The formula should be completed. This is trivial:
(2) The second call in T with the accept in T". To complete {i = I A k = 0 A GI} k := 1; null {i = 1 A k = 1 A GI}, is even more trivial:
Notice that here, the implication i = l+ j = 1, part of GI, is needed; otherwise the second part of GI, k = 1 + j = 1, cannot be derived.
(3) The call in T" with the second accept in T'. This is left to the reader. Application of R9, the parallel composition rule, yields {i=OAj=OAk=OAGI} begin task Tiltask T'IItask T"end {i=1Aj=IAX=2Ak=1AGI}.
Using the consequence rule to get the post-assertion x=2 and the Av-rule, which may be applied now, to remove the auxiliary variables, the formula reduces to {i = 0 A j = 0 A k = 0 A GI} begin task T II task T' 11 task T" end {x = 2). Now, the substitution rule can be used to substitute 0 for i, j and k in the pre-assertion. Formula (3.5) is obtained by reducing the pre-assertion to true with a final application of the consequence rule. It should be remarked here that, although in this example, GI only relates locations in different tasks with each other, in general GI also carries other state information; see for instance the example proof in Section 4.
The above development mirrors the development of the csp-system in [5] . In fact, all of the above examples and problems have their counterpart in that proof system. However, the construction of a proof system for ADA-CF also introduces problems which are particular for that language, and it is to these problems that the rest of this section addresses itself. They result from the possibility of having occurrences of calls or accepts within the body of another accept; such a nesting of communication statements is not possible in CSP. This will enforce a refinement of the notion of bracketing.
It has also consequences for the formulation of the final-still missing-proof rule to derive the { p}C 11 A{q}-type formulae of the cooperation test. First an example will show that, although introducing bracketings (and global invariants and auxiliary variables) has made the proof system (seemingly) complete, at the same time it has made it unsound! Example 3.6. Consider the following proof outlines (h is an auxiliary variable): The individual proof outlines are correct and if they are combined, they 'prove' {true} begin task T 11 task T' 11 task T" end {y = 0).
However, the reader easily sees that after termination, y = 1 holds. The problem is of course the assumption of T", x = 0, (which follows from rule Rl) about the value it receives from T'. This assertion should not pass the cooperation test for the accept in T" with the entry call in T'. Unfortunately it does, and vacuously so, as the conjunction of the respective pre-assertions with GI yields false: h = 1 A true A h = 0. The test for the other matching pair holds too (this time rightly so). Hence, the outlines can be combined and the proof system allows 'proofs' of invalid formulae and is consequently not sound.
Analyzing theexample shows this disparity to be caused by the nested occurrence of the entry call within the body of the accept in T', because GI should also hold when such inner calls or accepts are reached. As these appear within the bracketed section of the outer accept in which GI need not hold, indeed cannot hold as its variables are being updated, this means that the range of the bracketed sections is too large and must somehow be restricted so as to contain precisely one call or accept each. (2) each call and accept is bracketed as above.
Clause l(a) of this definition has remained the same; the other clauses have changed. Clearly, the intention of this change is that GI must be shown to hold again, whenever S' (in clause l(b)) has been executed and hence before another call or accept can be encountered. Having obtained the correct notion of bracketing and cooperation, the last task is to define formally how to prove the formulae of the cooperation test. During the remainder of this section, the following entry call and matching accept will be fixed, with pre and post-assertions as indicated:
(3.9) {PJ (accept c(G# 6) do {piI Si ;> {PJ S I4d; (Si IdI endaccept) {qd.
These bracketed sections are denoted by (C) and (A) respectively (the call is part of a task T).
The question is, how to prove {P,"PzhG1}CIIA{q,hqzAcI}. (3.10)
According to the semantics of a rendezvous and the intention of the bracketing and the cooperation test (and as suggested in the various examples), proof of this formula requires that the following partial proof outline can be completed: {PI A P2 A GI) (3.11) (Z:= v' denotes the simultaneous assignment of the variables in the list c' to the corresponding variables in 2; likewise for the assignment 11, v':= Z, x'). In this partial outline only pi, p2, ql, q2 and GI are known assertions; p, q and the other assertions which are not shown, have to be found.
Completion of (3.11) in this form turns out to be not that satisfactory a solution. The problem is, that the cooperation test would force for each accept A, a set of different proof outlines to be completed, one for each call matching with A, because the to-be-guessed assertions in (3.11) have to relate the states of the task containing the call, T, and the task containing the accept, T', to each other. Hence, it is not possible just to substitute the assertions from the 'regular' proof outline of the accept-body in (3.9) for the missing ones in (3.11). A second reason for not adopting this solution, is that the whole format of the cooperation test would break down: Operationally, the cooperation test must show that whenever execution reaches a state in which control is simultaneously at some matching call-accept pair, the assumptions about the resulting rendezvous in the proof outlines of the respective tasks are correct (and that GI holds again after updating its variables). Formulation of this test essentially hinges on the assumption that such task-states are characterized by the appropriate unique pre-assertions of the corresponding proof outlines and GI: The set of cooperating conditions is determined purely by the syntactic structure of the program and in no way depends on a particular program proof. Now suppose the accept A to contain an inner call C'. As more than one proof outline has to be constructed for the outermost accept, more than one pre-assertion is obtained for the inner call. In other words, a particular pre-assertion does not fully characterize anymore, the task-states in which control is at C'. Consequently, the cooperation test-using the approach of (3.1 I) for proving (3.10)-breaks down, because for each matching pair as many tests must be generated as there are different preassertions. The effect is self-propagating:
Each of these tests results in a new proof outline to be completed for an accept A' matching with the call C'. In its turn, A' may contain an inner call too and still more checks have to be generated (although the total number of tests remains finite). 6 These phenomena show that in order to obtain a usable proof system for ADA-CF,
another approach to the proof of (3.10) has to be found. An approach that retains the notion of proof outline in the sense that for an accept too, only one proof outline need be constructed; the cooperation test should not require additional ones. This means that the proof outline of the body of such an accept must be canonical in the sense that its constituent assertions must be strong enough to justify the assumptions of each matching call and, symmetrically, must be weak enough to remain valid under the 'value-injection' of each matching call. Disregarding synchronization, a rendezvous is equivalent to an ordinary procedure-call.
A similar quest for canonical proofs can be found in the literature dealing with proof rules for procedure-calls.
There, the simplest approach is the simulation of parameter transfer by syntactical substitution of actual for formal parameters. To achieve this, restrictions must be imposed on the actual parameters allowed; see also [3] . The same approach is adopted in the current case, and hinges on the following We do not prove this theorem here, but instead refer the reader to [15]; it is not a striking result and an analogous one is, e.g., embodied in E.R. Olderog's rule 26
in [3] . The restrictions 3.12(a) and (b) correspond precisely to the restrictions Rl, . . . , R4 in Section 2 (the third one in 3.12(a) is subsumed by Rl). Under these restrictions, 3 .12(2) shows actual parameter assignment and substitution to be equivalent: 3.12( 1)
shows that a canonical proof (outline) for S can be used to obtain information about any 'acceptable' call (acceptable, meaning that assigning the actual parameters to the formal one leaves the pre-assertion, p, valid).
We proceed with an informal deduction of the rendezvous-rule, to be used in proving the formulae in the cooperation test. Theorem 3.12(2) suggests that instead of completing (3.11) one might try and complete {PI A PzhGIl (3.13) (remember that FV(P,, q,, pz. q2, a, S,, S,)n{G, 6}=0; p and q, still have to be determined). Now consider the proof outline in (3.9) for (~7~) S {q2}. is not yet strong enough to be used in (3.13) because p and q have to contain state-information of both T' (containing the accept of (3.9)) and T (containing the call).
During execution of S, the state of T remains$xed and (hence) is characterized by the pre-assertion of the call, p,. Consequently, 8, is invariant over S; p, is even invariant over S[ -1, because ~v(ji,) n (2) = 0 (this explains the role of the restriction in the call-axiom Al). GI, too, may be assumed to be invariant over S and hence ever S[ -1 (remember, GI does not contain formal parameters as free variables) because inner calls or accepts are dealt with separately. Now, it is a fact that, using auxiliary variables and GI, an assertion such as p, 'talking' about the state of two different tasks, T' and T, can always be split into two assertions, p, and pZ, each talking about the state of only one task (i.e., p, about T and p2 about T'); see e.g., the completeness proof in [ 151. Consequently, formula (3.13) can be written as
{PI J'PzAGI}
And, as far as the accept-body is concerned, there only remains the proof of { p2[ *I} S[ * ] {&[ *I} for which it suffices to prove { p2} S {q2} which is already part of the proof outline of T'.
These arguments lead up to the last rule of the ADA-CF proof system, the rendezvous-rule: Recapitulating, the premises in this rule embody the cooperation test over the two bracketed sections. Assigning the actual to the formal parameters has been modelled by syntactic substitution (due to Theorem 3.12 and the restrictions on the actual parameters of Section 2). The same theorem implies that a new proof for the accept-body, S, need not be constructed for every matching call and instead we may just substitute the actual for the formal parameters in the proof outline for S in task T'. In other words, it is always possible to give a canonical proof for an accept-body which suffices for the cooperation test for all matching entry calls. In the first premiss, we must, among other things, show that the actual parameters obey the assumptions of the accept, i.e., we must derive pre(S)[-1. If they do, posr(S) [-] specifies the result of executing the accept-body. The intermediate assertion, pre('call'), retains information about the variables in task T, other than the actual parameters: i.e., it retains'information about those variables of T that cannot be changed by executing S.
Canonicity of the proof of an accept-body is essential. We already indicated that while discussing the cooperation test. When constructing a proof outline, one constructs unique pre-and post-assertions for every statement. Consequently, the assumption, permeating Section 3, that the proof of a component-task can always be rendered in the form of a proof outline, only now has been substantiated by the particular form of the rendezvous-rule.
The bodies of accept-statements can be proved canonically, but we did have to compromize: The rendezvous-rule clearly shows that for the bracketed sections associated with an accept, we do have to construct multiple proofs (similarly for entry calls). However, the completeness proof of the proof system [I51 shows that bracketed sections need only contain one assignment each, so this seems a small price to pay.
Proof of the bounded buffer program
In this section the example program in Section 2 is proved correct w.r.t. the specification ' Remember that S obeys the clauses RI,. . . , R4 of Section 2. begin task producer 11 task consumer 11 task buffer end {Vi= l..n uecI(i)= uec2(i)}.
For the proof, auxiliary variables are introduced: -in the producer task, h,; recording the sequence of values sent off, -in the consumer task, h,: recording the sequence of values received, -in the buffer task h; and h;; recording the sequence of values received, respectively, sent off. These auxiliary variables denote sequences. In the proof outline, 'a b' denotes the concatenation of sequences 'a' and 'b', or of the sequence 'u' and the element '6'. In the assertions, arrays or array-slices will also be used as sequences. The general invariant is the obvious one, stating that each value that is sent is also received:
We show that the proof outlines cooperate w.r.t. this GI:
Consider the entry put. There is only one matching pair to consider, and for this pair the rendezvous-rule requires the proofs of {h,=AA~,=AAhz=A~h;=AAh,=~,~hz=h;} begin task producer' 11 task consumer' 11 task bufler' end {h,=uecI(l..n)Ahz=uec2(l..n)A~,=h;Apoo~(out~in)Ah,=~,Ahz=h;}.
The post-assertion can be reduced to "Vi= I..n oecl(i)= uec2(i)" by applying the consequence-rule. Next, the auxiliary variables can be removed. Finally, substituting A, the empty sequence, for h,, 6,, h, and h; and using the consequence-rule again, reduces the pre-assertion to true, thus completing the proof.
Although the buffer-task has an entry term for the sole purpose of letting the task terminate, the proof does not refer to it. This is because we have only shown partial correctness of the program. In fact, in Section 7 where, as an example, termination of the program is proved, the current proof outlines have to be strengthened.
In this proof, 4 auxiliary variables have been used which seems excessive. The two auxiliary variables in the buffer-task would be rendered unnecessary if the array pool could be used in GI. The problem is, that then the variables in, out and count would be needed too. Unfortunately, the bracketed sections cannot be extended so as to encompass all updatings of these variables; at least, not with the current definition of bracketing. On the other hand, it is not difficult to envisage an appropriate generalization of bracketing which would allow one to do just that. As for the other two auxiliary variables, these can obviously be removed (provided the initializations of i and j are 'moved' to the respective pre-assertions).
For an actual proof along these lines, without the use of auxiliary variables, the reader is referred to [7] . We stipulate however, that the format of the above proof reflects the way in which proofs have to be structured in general.
Safety properties
Section 3 presented a proof system for proving partial correctness properties of The principal question is whether the proof system has to be extended to prove such properties. The answer is, perhaps at first somewhat surprising: No; proof outlines as they are, are 'strong' enough to derive safety properties from. On the other hand, it is not that surprising because, as indicated before, the pre-assertion of some statement (in some valid proof outline of a task T), characterizes the state of T whenever control arrives at this statement. The only moot point concerns the proof outlines of the accept-bodies in 7'. These, by definition, cannot specify the values of the forma1 parameters during a particular rendezvous and, consequently, cannot fully characterize the state of T at such a time.
The rest of this section shows how to derive descriptions about the state at intermediate points, from a proof outline. Then, showing that some safety assertion, SA, holds for a program, means constructing a proof outline and showing that the state-descriptions derived from this outline imply the corresponding state-assertions Of SA.
First some notation has to be introduced in order to (syntactically) specify such intermediate points, called frontiers of computation. This is not altogether trivial, as tasks communicate: Specifying that a task T is within some accept implies that some other task is at an entry call engaged in a rendezvous with this accept. Likewise, if this entry call is within another accept there must be a third task engaged in a rendezvous with that accept. So, in general there can be a chain of tasks, waiting for T to finish (executing the accept); a so-called calling chain for T. Evidently, not every set of 'points' within a program is a frontier of computation which can (potentially) be reached during the execution of this program.
Frontiers of computation are built up as follows: First, controlpoints are introduced to specify points in isolated tasks. Next, control points are combined into multi-control points; these specify a point in some task T which is 'active', in general together with a specific calling chain for T.* Finally, a frontier of computation consists of a maxima1 set of 'non-conflicting' multicontrol points. Such control points, multi-control points and frontiers of computation do not appear, however, in the assertions of a proof outline. This contrasts with [19] , in which Lamport introduces location predicates (these correspond to our location points) into his assertion-language so as to obtain a safety proof system.
For the connoisseur of csp it may be interesting to know that for CSP, multi control points degenerate to control points as CSP does not admit calling chains.
.
185
To refer to a particular statemen; 6, a unique name, 'S', is introduced; e.g., to distinguish between two occurrences of an assignment x := 1. If 'C' denotes an entry call, the bracketed section surrounding 'C' is denoted by '(C)'. Such names will not be further specified and the reader may think of some form of labeling.
Definition 5.0. Let 'S' denote a statement, 'C' an entry call and let T be the name of some task. A control point (c.p.) is one of the following:
(1) at('S'), (2) at(T), (3) after(T), (4) in('C').
A c.p. belongs to a task T, if the statement it refers to is part of the task T.
The interpretation of these c.p.'s is suggested by their form: ar('S') denotes the point just before '9; likewise, af( T) and after(T) denote the points just before and after the body of T; in('C') is somewhat special and denotes the 'point' which is reached when 'C' becomes engaged in a rendezvous (until this happens, the task would be at('C')). Such points are used to specify calling chains. Notice, that in('C') does not correspond to an actual point in the program text, although it is clearly a well-defined point which is reached during execution of a rendezvous when the actual parameters have been sent to the callee but the rendezvous has not yet terminated;
see also [25] in which similar observations are made. Next, dependencies between c.p.'s of different tasks are described. Notice that the 'rendezvous' specified in a c.c., are syntactically possible ones and nothing is implied about their actual occurrence. for a program P, is a set {X"', . . . , Xc")}, such that (1) for each task in P there is a c.p. belonging to it, and (2) The discussion in the last part of Section 3 indicates that pre('C') characterizes the state of the task containing the call 'C', when a rendezvous ('through' 'C') is in progress. Consequently, the assertion to associate with in('C') is pre('C'). A little thought makes it clear that with a f.o.c., we should associate the conjunction of GI and the assertions associated with its constituent c.p.'s. The presence of GI is quite essential and is needed (I) to relate the states of the different tasks, referenced in the f.o.c., with each other, and (2) to express that the syntactic matches, as specified in the m.c.p.'s, match semantically.
If some of them in a m.c.p. do not semantically match, the conjunction can be made to yieldfalse (by strengthening GI if necessary), which-as usual-is interpreted as stating that the m.c.p. cannot be reached in any computation of the program. Finally, what assertions should be associated with c.p.'s of the form at('C') ('C' an entry call)? Certainly not pre('C') for the reason stated above, since no rendezvous involving 'C' is in progress as yet. Conceptually, ut('(C)') is the point at which a task waits for a rendezvous with 'C' to take place: The updating of (auxiliary) variables in the first part of '(C)', indicates just that. This suggests that the preassertion of the bracketed section surrounding 'C', pre('(C)'), be associated with ut('C'). Of course, bracketed sections may contain assignmdnts to 'normal' taskvariables, too, and so one may be less than happy with this suggestion. However, it is the only feasible choice as validity of GI is needed. Hence, Often when specifying f.o.c.'s, we will not bother to define c.p.'s for every task.
In such cases, it is tacitly assumed that in each of such tasks, control resides at some arbitrary but specific c.p., obeying the restriction in 5.4(2) if necessary. One question remains unanswered.
Namely, how to include the value of formal parameters in the state descriptions.
In fact, we already have provided the answer, because one of the functions of GI is to encode which values are communicated during a particular rendezvous;
hence, GI can always be strengthened so as to encode these values (given completeness of the proof system). This is illustrated in Example 5.5. Consider the example proof of Section 4. We show that whenever control is at the f.o.c.'{( in ( I,) , at( Is)), (at( Id))}, x -oecl(i) holds. This is in fact quite -trivial: According to Definition 5.4.,
This implies that uec 1( 1 ..i) = h; >ool(out 0 in) ^x and hence that x = vet 1 (i).
The contents of this section will be extensively used in the remainder of the paper.
Deadlock freedom
As in [5] , the concept of blocking is introduced. It originated with Owicki in [24] .
In our context, a blocking of a program is a f.o.c. in which no component task can proceed (but in which the program has not terminated yet). Consequently, a program is deadlock free (w.r.t. some pre-assertion, p, characterizing the initial state in which execution starts), precisely when no blocking is semantically possible. To simplify the definitions in the sequel somewhat, a restriction on ADA-CF programs is introduced: accepts may only appear in a program as the initial statement of a branch of a select. Notice that an accept, A, is trivially equivalent to select true: A endselect.
Consider a f.o.c. x for some program P. Intuitively (and roughly), P cannot proceed in x when the frontier tasks of the m.c.p.'s cannot proceed. I.e., when each frontier task is either terminated or at some entry call or select, but there are no syntactic matches between the entry calls and any accept in an open branch of one of the selects in these frontier tasks. This characterization is partly syntactic and partly semantic in nature. The syntactic part is the subject of: Definition 6.0. Let x be a f.o.c. for a program begin task T, 11. * * 11 task 7'" end. Let XI,..., x, be the sequence of c.p.'s in x; c.p. xi belonging to task Tb Furthermore, let T',, . . . , T: be the sequence of frontier tasks of x.
Then, x is a blockingfionrier of compufarion (b.f.0.c.) iff
(1) x #WWTd,.
. . , (afier(T,)>l, (2) each xi (in frontier task T;) is either of the form afretor of the form at('S'), where 'S' is an entry call or a select, k = I..t, (3) if XL is of the form ar('call T,.a(---)') then xi # ufter( T,) (k = I..r).
Clause (I) implies that the program should not have terminated yet and clause (2) indicates that a task can always proceed if it is not at an accept or entry call.
Clause (3) is necessary because calling an entry of an already terminated task results in failure.
In order to formulate that execution cannot proceed in some b.f.o.c., an auxiliary predicate is introduced:
Let 'S' denote a statement select b, : S, or . * * or 6, : S,, endselect and let Z G { 1 ..n}. Then B(x) = count 2 100 A counr < 0 A fnre, which is false, independent of the truth-value of R(X) (which is true incidently).
So, although x can be reached, x will not be blocked and no deadlock occurs. The reader will have no difficulties checking that these changes leave the proof outlines valid and that they cooperate w.r. This example clearly shows that to prove deadlock freedom, in general, the proof outlines have to be stronger than the ones needed for proving partial correctness properties.
Termination and absence of failure
In this section, the proof system is extended (for the last time) in order to reason about termination and failure. To this end, proof rules have to be replaced by new ones. These changes also enforce adaptation of the notion of proof outlines. As these adaptations are straightforward, they are left to the reader.
First consider termination.
A program terminates if it does not admit infinite computations:
i.e., if each computation terminates either properly (by reaching the end of the program) or in failure or in deadlock.
Notice that we implicitly make the assumption here, that execution of a program only halts when nothing else is possible. Clearly, without this assumption a program that does not loop or fail or deadlock need not terminate either, as execution might just stop in the middle of the program. In the terminology of [25] , we assume that execution of a program is just in the sense that if execution of a task can proceed, it will proceed in finite time.
Obviously, the only source of non-termination is the while statement. The technique to prove termination of a while statement is well-known (cf. [3] ): Find a quantity which decreases with every iteration, but cannot decrease indefinitely. This is embodied in the following rule, taken from [3] , which replaces the older rule for while statements, R4:
R4'. while:
where p(n) is an assertion with a free variable n, ranging over the natural numbers, such that n e! FV(S).
This well-known rule appears in various forms throughout the literature on proof systems for sequential languages. One might ask why it suffices in this concurrent context, too. The reason is simply that the behaviour of a task's environment can be fully specified by the assertions associated with the task's accepts and calls (this is the sole reason that makes it possible to construct task proofs in isolation). Given these assertions, a component proof is constructed as for a sequential program; i.e., one has complete information about the result of executing the task's statements. The entry queues of full ADA induce a fairness constraint on the possible executions of a program. Such queues enforce a specific discipline of accepting entry calls within select-statements, with the consequence that [25] "no task can wait forever on a call for some entry, e, while infinitely many other calls for e are accepted" (see also Section 9). Consequently, one can show that full ADA admits so-called unbounded nondererminism [4] , which implies that the above approach to termination does not suffice for full ADA." This matter is, however, too technical for the current paper. We stress the fact, that it can be dealt with routinely, by adapting any of the rules for fair termination to the environment of distributed computing. Next, we turn to absence of failure. Ignoring failure caused by operations on data (e.g. division by 0), there remain two sources of failure:
(1) a select without an open branch and (2) a call for an entry of a task which has already terminated (or is about to terminate). Hence, these two situations must be proved never to occur. Basically, proving absence of failure is quite straightforward. One simply strengthens the assertions of the proof outline so that the pre-assertion of any statement implies that execution of that statement does not result in failure.
As for (I) , one must consequently show that the pre-assertion of any select implies the existence of at least one open branch of that select. This is embodied in the following rule which replaces the select rule R2:
R2'. select: should not be reachable.
Using the proof outline of bufer' strengthened as above,
which implies false. Reachability of {(ar( la)), (ufrer(bufer'))} is treated completely analogously.
To show that {( at( I?)), (ufter( buffer'))} and {( ut( 15)), (ujler( bujlier'))} are not reachable either, we have to resort to the same trick as in Example 6.3, this time left to the reader.
Correctness of a distributed priority queue
This priority queue is based on Brinch Hansen's sorting algorithm in [9] . In order to code the algorithm and its driver-task, some trivial extensions to ADA-CF are made by (I) introducing task-arrays: If sort denotes some task, then sort( 1.. 10) denotes an array of 10 identical tasks, denoted by sorr( l), sort (2) Execution of the loop-body is iterated as long as some boolean guard evaluates to true (on loop entrance).
The loop-body is executed by arbitrarily choosing an S,, whose guard, c,, evaluates to true, and executing it.
A moment of reflection will make it clear that for proving an assertion p to be a loop-invariant (for the above guarded loop), one should prove that {p A ci} S, {p} holds (i = 1 ..n).
Description of the algorithm and its implementation
The priority queue consists of a row of n identical tasks and can sort up to n elements (n is an arbitrary positive integer constant). The elements are input through the first task, which stores the smallest element so far encountered and passes on the rest to its successor. The latter task keeps the second smallest item and passes on the rest, and so on. The elements are output (in increasing order) through the first task. After each output, a task receives one of the remaining elements from its successor. A task is in equilibrium when it holds a single element or when it holds none and neither do its successors. When the equilibrium of a task is disturbed (by its predecessor), it takes one of the following actions: (1) if the task now has two elements, it keeps the smaller one and passes on the larger one to its successor, or (2) if the task now has no elements but its successor does, it takes the (smallest) element from its successor. The priority queue is implemented by a task-array sort( I..n). The elements of each task are kept in an array here: len contains the number of elements currently present, while rest contains the number of elements which have been passed on.
Each component task has two entries, put and gel; to put elements into respectively, to get elements from a task. When a call for put is accepted, the received element is placed in the array here. Then, if the task finds itself having two elements, it sorts the elements in here into increasing order and sends off the larger one (contained in here(f)). An entry call for get is only accepted by a task, if len = 1 holds. In that case, the task sends back its element, after which it obtains the element from its successor (if it has any). Here, x:= ? denotes the assignment of an arbitrary (integer) value to x. The variable bag is of type bag of int, which means that it is a set in which the same value may appear more than once. The operators G3 and 0 denote the union and the splitting of bags (no values are thrown away); #a --j is our bag-constructor and c3 denotes the empty bag. The variable bag retains all values which have entered &he queue but have not left it as yet, and is needed to express the safety property we want to prove below. Notice that the nondeterministic way in which a branch is choosen during each iteration of the guarded loop, forces the task-array to function as a priority queue rather than as a sorter.
Correctness proof
Consider the program begin task driver 11 task sort( 1 ..n) end.
We want to derive for this program, the safety assertion R({(after(m,))})+ x = min(bag).
I.e., whenever a value is removed from the queue, it is minimal amongst the values which have entered the queue up till now. Notice, that to say that it is minimal amongst the values which are still in the queue, would be a weaker assertion, as this would allow the program to forget some values. This motivates the use of the bag-variable in the driver.
In the proof outline(s) of the task-array, auxiliary variables, kept and sent, are used; all of type bag of int. The values which are present in sort(i) are kept in kepti (remember, the variables are assumed to be indexed); sent, contains the values which have been sent to sort(i)'s successor and have not yet been returned. In the proof outline of the driver-task only one auxiliary variable is introduced, sent,, of the same type and with the same function as the other Sent,'s.
The general invariant expresses that no transmitted value is lost:
GI zz A (Senti = kept,,, @sent,+,).
i=O
The proof outlines of the component tasks are all the same. Hence we will give a 'canonical' one. To obtain the proof outline of a component task, the reader should substitute the task-index for all appearances of the function this in the assertions. .i) and we should take the driver into account. However, these are dealt with just as easily and are left to the reader.
Extensions
We discuss some additional ADA-constructs which can be accommodated by the proof system. We also discuss the nature of some of the restrictions imposed upon the proof system.
There is of course a definite bound on what can be added without necessitating major changes or extensions to the proof system. For one, the fact that a program consists of a fixed set of tasks is quite essential; otherwise, the general invariant cannot be formulated.
Also, the possibility in full ADA of having access-variables referencing tasks is quite outside the scope of this proof system.
It is possible to extend ADA-CF with a rudimentary block-structure by allowing programs to appear in a task-body. I.e., by defining begin rusk {II rusk} end (cf. Section 2) to be a valid srur(-ement), too. As it is not possible to allow communication to occur between a task within a block and a task outside that block (for the reason stated above), such blocks are of limited value and we will not discuss the extensions needed for our system.
There are some ADA-statements which only need trivial extensions to the proof system. These are (1) the delay, (2) the conditional and timed entry call and (3) the full ADA selective wait statement. The effect of these statements is either not expressible in our assertion language (as for the delay, which suspends execution of the task that executes it for some time) or we do not want to take their effect into account (as for the other statements). But this is not enough. The post-assertion of a task-body characterizes the state of that task when it terminates.
Consequently
If a task terminates by executing a termstat, it does so in a state characterized by the pre-assertion of this termstat. So, to be consistent, Next, some of the restrictions of ADA-CF are discussed. For the connoisseur of ADA, perhaps the most noticeable restriction of ADA-CF is the absence of entry queues. In full ADA, each entry has an entry queue associated with it. A task executing an entry call is put on the queue associated with it. When a task is ready to accept a call for an entry, the call of the task which is on top of the queue for this entry, is accepted first. An entry queue for some entry e, has an attribute, e'count, associated with it, which equals the number of tasks currently on the queue. Let us ignore such attributes for the moment.
Entry queues implement a mechanism for selecting entry calls to be accepted, which is fair in the sense that no particular entry call will wait indefinitely, while arbitrary many (other) calls for the same entry may proceed. As is well-known, fairness assumptions about the execution of a program do not alter the set of valid safety properties of the program. However, as indicated in Section 7, the property of termination does depend on fairness assumptions. An interesting question is whether the notion of fairness as stated here, is weaker than the (seemingly) stronger notion of fairness as implemented by entry queues (stronger, because when a task executes an entry cal! and is consequently put on an entry queue, it is exactly known how many calls will b: accepted before his call is accepted).
In [25] the following theorem is proved:
Theorem. Let P be an ADA-CF program (which consequently does not refer to any e'count attribute). Then, the set of possible executions for P (under the fairness assumption &xX?) is equivalent to the set of possible executions of P under the explicit queuing model. Hence, the above question can be answered in the negative. This theorem is proved by formalizing the observation that it is impossible for a program (not using queue attributes) to arrange for a specific order of tasks on an entry queue.
Prohibiting queue attributes is quite essential. If a program may use them, it can influence the ordering of tasks on entry queues and, consequently, even its set of valid safety properties may change. This is illustrated in the following In this program, task T' suspends executing its entry call until T has executed his. It does so, by inspecting the entry queue of entry e and by looping until the queue is not empty anymore. Consequently, the following formula is valid:
{true} begin task T 11 task T' }I task T" end {x = 1 A y = 2).
Such queue attributes act as a set of hidden variables which arz shared between the component tasks of a program. So, one might expect that using these attributes will force the proof system to be extended with some form of interference freedom test [241. We have not followed up on this suggestion as yet.
Finally, consider the syntactic restrictions in Section 2 on the actual and forma) parameters.
AS a result of these restrictions, parameter transfer can be modellrd using syntactic substitution.
Recent research ( [IO] and [16] ) has shown that these restrictions can be relaxed (for sequential procedure calls) and that some forms of aliasing in the actual parameters can be allowed, by refining the notion of syntactic substitution in assertions. These techniques can be applied in the current context, too. The resulting rendezvous rule will be somewhat less elegant, as the second clause of Theorem 3.12 breaks down if aliasing occurs in the actual parameters. This is, however, outside the scope of this paper.
Conclusion and related work
A small concurrency fragment of ADA has been defined. For this fragment, the idea of cooperation between proofs, which captures at the level of proof the simplest form of communication of values between distributed processes, has been extended to deal with a more complicated type of communication: the ADA-rendezvous mechanism.
Care has been taken to retain the notion of proof outline as capturing the idea that per control location, one assertion should suffice to characterize all states at such a location. We feel to have obtained a clean and elegant extension of the notion of cooperation and hence to have shown the rendezvous mechanism to have a simple and appealing semantics.
Alternative proof techniques for concurrent ADA programs do exist: In [7] and [2 I], Barringer and Mearns formulate another adaptation of cooperation to by-andlarge the same fragment of ADA. There, the original notion of bracketing (as introduced in [5] ) is retained. In [7] , nesting of such sections is allowed; consequently, they informally postulate a set of extra conditions that assertions 'within' bracketed sections should obey, in order to counter the problem with nesting as discussed in our paper. In [21], nested bracketed sections are syntactically transformed into non-nested sections, and an appropriate proof rule is provided to handle such transformations.
A second alternative is Schlichting and Schneider's [28] , in which the Levin/Gries [2O] approach to proving communicating processes correct, is extended to deal, amongst other communication-primitives, with the ADA-rendezvous. The second part of our paper develops a technique to extract invariance-assertions from (cooperating) proof outlines, which is then applied to deal with absence of deadlock, absence of failure and with distributed termination (absence of deadlock is treated in [7, 213, too) .
To extract such invariance-properties, we show how to characterize the state at any frontier of computation. Typically, in such frontiers more than one task participates. This contrasts with the way in which proof outlines are constructed in isolation.
At present, we are unsure as to how this phenomenon relates to programmingmethodology.
Thus, we end up with a question which is interesting, because it does not only concern ADA, but also any communication and synchronization mechanism, such as remote procedure-calls, which allows a task to engage in a communication with another task while still being synchronized with a third one.
